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SYMPOSIUM
THE LETHAL INJECTION DEBATE:
LAW AND SCIENCE
INTRODUCTION
Deborah W. Denno *
On April 16, 2008, for the first time in six decades, the United
States Supreme Court reviewed evidence concerning whether a
state's method of execution violated the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause? In Baze v. Rees,' a 7-2
plurality ruling,3 the Court upheld the constitutionality of Ken-
tucky's method of executing inmates by lethal injection, determin-
ing that Kentucky's administration of a three-drug combination
used by most death penalty states did not pose a "substantial" or
"objectively intolerable" risk of "serious harm" to inmates.4 The
Court also concluded that petitioners' proposed alternative method
of execution, consisting of a large dose of only the first of the three
drugs, was unacceptable.5
* Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
This Introduction is part of the Fordham Urban Law Journal's symposium on The
Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science. I am most grateful to Marianna Gebhardt
and Jennifer Woo for excellent comments and assistance, as well as to the Fordham
Urban Law Journal staff for outstanding editorial contributions.
1. This six-decade demarcation was profferred by the Court. See Baze v. Rees,
128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530-31 (2008) (plurality opinion) (discussing the Eighth Amendment
precedent of Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890), and Louisiana ex rel. v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)). There is room for
disagreement, however, on when the Court last reviewed evidence concerning the
constitutionality of an execution method. The Eighth Amendment provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. 128 S. Ct. at 1520.
3. Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion which Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito joined. Id. at 1525. Justice Alito
filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1538. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment. Id. at 1542. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
which Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 1552. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, which Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 1556. Justice Breyer filed an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1563. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opin-
ion, which Justice Souter joined. Id. at 1567.
4. Id. at 1531 (plurality opinion).
5. Id. at 1534-38.
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The road leading to Baze is well traveled with lethal injection
litigation; yet, post-Baze, there appear to be many more litigation
miles still to go. Ever since Oklahoma first adopted lethal injection
in 1977, attorneys have challenged the method's constitutionality
on a variety of grounds, ranging from the selection and qualifica-
tions of the execution team to the involvement of physicians in the
execution process to the formula developed for an injection.6 The
typical formula, which Kentucky uses, consists of a serial sequence
of three drugs: sodium thiopental, a common anesthetic for sur-
gery that is intended to cause unconsciousness; pancuronium bro-
mide, a total muscle relaxant that stops breathing by paralyzing the
diaphragm and lungs; and potassium chloride, a toxin that induces
cardiac arrest and permanently stops the inmate's heartbeat. 7
A primary concern in Baze and lethal injection litigation gener-
ally rests with the second drug, pancuronium bromide. Without
adequate anesthesia, pancuronium can cause an inmate excruciat-
ing pain and suffering because the inmate slowly suffocates from
the drug's effects while paralyzed and unable to cry out. Such ag-
ony is increased all the more when executioners inject the third
drug, potassium chloride, which creates an intense and unbearable
burning. There is agreement that if the sodium thiopental is inef-
fective, it would be unconscionable to inject the second and third
drugs into a conscious person. A key issue in litigation is whether
prison officials and executioners can determine if an inmate is
aware and in torment because the pancuronium is such a powerful
mask of emotions.8
In Baze, the Court found that Kentucky's Department of Cor-
rections took proper precautions to preclude a substantial risk of
maladministration of this three-drug combination.9 Yet there are
limits to the Court's analysis that suggest that it is by no means a
definitive response to the issue of lethal injection's constitutional-
ity.10 For example, Baze is so splintered that none of its seven
opinions comprises more than three votes; 1 the Justices also cite to
a wide range of explanations and qualifications about their reason-
6. See infra Symposium, The Lethal Injection Debate: Law & Science, 35 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 735-998 (2008).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533-34 (plurality opinion).
10. See Adam Liptak, Moratorium May Be Over, But Hardly the Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at A26 (citing commentators' responses to Baze).
11. See supra note 3.
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ing. 12 Likewise, the decision is narrowly confined to just Kentucky
and its particular protocol. While the Court asserts that its holding
pertains to state protocols that are "substantially similar" to Ken-
tucky's, the Court provides no guidance for the parameters of such
a comparison.1 3 Such obscurity is compounded further by Ken-
tucky's particular execution history. The state has conducted only
one lethal injection execution 14 and offers a limited record on
which to base a lethal injection challenge. 15 Other states have far
better evidence and execution data.16 These points are critical
given that lethal injection has been adopted for use by all but one
of the thirty-six death penalty states and the federal government."
While it is beyond the scope of this Introduction to analyze Baze in
further detail, one matter seems clear. Voices on both sides of the
death penalty debate have emphasized that Baze left doors open
for future lethal injection challenges. 8
There is no better background for attempting to enter, or close,
those doors than the Fordham Urban Law Journal's symposium is-
sue, The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science. This forum, the
first of its kind on this topic, reflects the latest balanced perspective
on the legal, medical, and ethical concerns over lethal injection
from some of the country's leading experts. While the Court's
September 2007 grant of certiorari in Baze19 led to a de facto na-
tional moratorium on executions, 20 as of this writing, states have
12. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at Al (discussing each of the Baze Court's seven
opinions).
13. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537 (plurality opinion) ("A State with a lethal injection
protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not create a risk
that meets this standard."). But see id. at 1562 ("At what point does a risk become
substantial?") (Thomas, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 1528 (plurality opinion).
15. See infra notes 53-57 (discussing Richard Dieter's article).
16. See Liptak, supra note 10, at A26.
17. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dis-
mantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 59-60 (2007). Prior to Baze,
numerous states-and the federal government-ceased executions entirely, many
due, in whole or part, to lethal injection-related challenges. Id. at 60-61.
18. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1542 ("When we granted certiorari in this case, I as-
sumed that our decision would bring the debate about lethal injection as a method of
execution to a close. It now seems clear that it will not.") (Stevens, J., concurring); see
id. at 1562 ("[F]ar from putting an end to abusive litigation in this area ... today's
decision is sure to engender more litigation.") (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
Liptak, supra note 10, at A26 (discussing commentators' views that the litigation
would continue).
19. 128 S. Ct. 34 (2007).
20. See infra notes 55-56 (discussing Richard Dieter's article); see also Denno,
supra note 17, at 60-61.
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started to set execution dates and to execute .2  Lethal injection
litigation has continued, picking up where the Baze Court last left
off.
Some of the unsettled disputes in Baze pertain to how the
Court's Eighth Amendment standards will apply in practice. This
symposium's ten articles provide the proper insight and context for
making that determination. The first two articles by federal judges
Jeremy Fogel and Fernando Gaitan establish a foundation for ad-
dressing many of the major deficiencies that prompted the Court to
grant Baze certiorari. Fogel's article, In the Eye of the Storm: A
Judge's Experience in Lethal-Injection Litigation, analyzes those
California cases decided between 2004-2006 that challenged the
constitutionality of the state's lethal injection protocol. 22 The dis-
cussion focuses particularly on Morales v. Tilton,23 over which
Fogel presided. While Fogel cannot comment on the merits of
Morales because it is still pending before him, he considers Morales
"unique" and the most demanding "intellectually, emotionally, and
spiritually" of all the "many thousands of disputes" he has han-
dled.24 The facts and procedural backdrop of Morales help to ex-
plain why.
Based on a variety of reasons-ranging from the findings of a
2005 article in Lancet25 reporting insufficient levels of sodium thio-
pental in lethally injected inmates to growing evidence of Califor-
nia's own particular protocol problems-Fogel rendered a ruling in
Morales that was unlike any other before it. For California to con-
duct the lethal injection execution of Michael Morales, the state
had to choose one of two court-mandated options: provide quali-
fied medical personnel who would ensure Morales was unconscious
during the procedure, or alter the department of corrections' pro-
tocol so that only sodium thiopental would be given, rather than
the standard sequence of three different drugs. Strikingly, the state
chose to have medical experts present at Morales's execution-a
21. Shaila Dewan, Releases From Death Row Raise Doubts Over Quality of De-
fense, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at Al (discussing the May 6, 2008 execution of Wil-
liam E. Lynd in Georgia, the first execution since the de facto moratorium due to
Baze).
22. Jeremy Fogel, In the Eye of the Storm: A Judge's Experience in Lethal-Injec-
tion Litigation, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 735 (2008).
23. 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006), prelim. inj. conditionally denied sub
nom., Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006), affd per curiam,
438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1163 (2006).
24. Fogel, supra note 22, at 735.
25. Id. at 739 (citing Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anesthesia in Lethal
Injection for Execution, 365 LANCET 1412 (2005)).
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decision that garnered controversy at the time but even more so
later when the two anesthesiologists who were selected resigned
mere hours before Morales's scheduled execution time. Because of
their ethical responsibilities, the anesthesiologists would not accept
the interpretation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit that they would have to intervene personally and provide med-
ication or medical assistance if the inmate appeared conscious or in
great pain.26 This predicament prompted Fogel to organize an un-
usually long and thorough evidentiary hearing-one that would re-
sult in a December 15, 2006 memorandum order stating that
"unless California made substantial revisions to its protocol, [he]
would declare it unconstitutional. '27 On May 15, 2007, California
filed a detailed response, which is currently the subject of pending
litigation before Fogel.28
In this context, Fogel's experiences with Morales are captivating
pronouncements "on the workings of our legal system, a medita-
tion on being a judge, and a reflection upon the potency of the
death penalty as an issue in our society. '2 9 He highlights five par-
ticularly important experiences, all of which accentuate the extent
to which new information about lethal injection over the years has
either been the inspiration to acquire further knowledge on the
subject or served as a source of varied perceptions and miscom-
munications among different actors in the criminal justice system.
First, Fogel describes the evolution of his views on lethal injection,
beginning with his skepticism about lethal injection's risks and end-
ing with his decision to enjoin Morales's execution when he be-
came more educated on lethal injection's hazards. Second, Fogel
emphasizes the general divide and varying perceptions toward le-
gal issues among judges, lawyers, and corrections personnel. In his
view, "the legal system and the corrections bureaucracy are differ-
ent cultures in which the same words and events often have differ-
ent implications and consequences."3 For Fogel, this revelation
prompts a firm take-home message for judges: "While our obliga-
tion to be meticulous in our legal analysis and legally coherent in
our orders and decisions remains the same, we also have to con-
26. See Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 976; see also Morales, 438 F.3d at 931.
27. Fogel, supra note 22, at 743 (citing Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 974).
28. Id. at 743 n.51.
29. Id. at 735.
30. Id. at 748.
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sider the dynamics of the institution in which our orders and deci-
sions will be implemented."'"
Fogel's third experience pertains to how the media's coverage of
lethal injection challenges has changed over time. At least initially,
many news articles broadly, and inaccurately, pitched the topic as
"whether lethal injection in the abstract is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" or "whether it is constitutional for a condemned inmate
to suffer any pain at all"; only a few articles addressed the actual
(and far more narrow) issue in Morales, which was whether Cali-
fornia's protocol operated as was intended when it was imple-
mented. 32 After Morales's execution was postponed, however, the
news media became substantially more analytical and correct.
Fogel's fourth experience also reflects this broad versus narrow di-
vergence. For example, during the public debate about California's
lethal injection cases, particularly Morales, the focus was on the
viability of the death penalty itself rather than the specific concerns
pertaining to lethal injection. Because a lethal injection challenge
can possibly postpone an inmate's execution, it prompts deeper re-
flections about the meaning and purpose of punishment more gen-
erally. Judges must balance awareness of the non-lawyer public's
reactions to the handling of lethal injection cases with a need to
abide by the legal process.
Fogel's fifth and last experience reveals the extent to which
judges are usually personally separated from the consequences of
their decisions. For Fogel, this barrier dissolved in February 2006
when he became deeply enmeshed "in the most intense discussions
and hearings imaginable" concerning how Michael Morales would
be executed-a circumstance that involved not only Morales's
death but also the future lives of the victim's family as they waited
for over a quarter century for closure. 33 Being presented with such
an extraordinary personal and professional challenge, Judge Fogel
relies on faith, family, friends, and the legal process itself to pro-
vide solace and strength in reaching his decisions, including what
the future may hold for Morales.
By the time Fogel issued his December 2006 memorandum deci-
sion in Morales determining that California's lethal injection proto-
31. Id. at 749.
32. Id. at 750.
33. Id. at 759.
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col "as implemented" violated the Eighth Amendment,34
Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. had already reached such a conclusion
about Missouri's protocol in Taylor v. Crawford.35 Litigation in
Taylor showed numerous problems with Missouri's execution pro-
cedures. Not only did the state lack a written protocol, for exam-
ple, but the doctor who had supervised fifty-four executions over
the course of a decade had a record of more than twenty malprac-
tice suits and revoked privileges at two hospitals. Testimony also
revealed that the doctor's dyslexia hindered his ability to mix drugs
properly and that he adjusted dosages at his discretion, without
oversight.36 The combined impact of the holdings in Morales and
Taylor was a powerful legal force. Indeed, less than a year after
those decisions, in Harbison v. Little,37 a Tennessee district court
would similarly find its state's revised protocol unconstitutional.38
Gaitan's symposium article, Challenges Facing Society in the Im-
plementation of the Death Penalty, provides an overview of the sig-
nificance of Taylor, Morales, and Harbison, along with a sampling
of comparable challenges in other states, including Florida.39 Like
Fogel, Gaitan begins his article emphasizing the stress that was in-
volved in presiding over lethal injection challenges. In "nearly
twenty-seven years as a judicial officer," there were "few issues...
that have caused more anxiety. '40 Yet, the Eighth Amendment's
"'evolving standards of decency"' have changed perceptions of the
meaning of what punishments are considered "cruel and unusual"
and, for judges, the "principle of law" must remain paramount.41
After examining the historical development of lethal injection,
Gaitan analyzes the scope of constitutional standards that courts
34. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2006), prelim. inj. condi-
tionally denied sub nom, Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006),
affd per curiam, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1163 (2006).
35. Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D.
Mo. June 26, 2006) ("determin[ing] that Missouri's current method of administering
lethal injections subjects condemned inmates to an unacceptable risk of suffering un-
constitutional pain and suffering"), rev'd, 487 F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007) (revers-
ing district court's holding that the state's revised protocol violated the Eighth
Amendment), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3568 (Apr. 21, 2008).
36. Id. at *4-6.
37. Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872 (M.D. Tenn. 2007).
38. Id. at 903 ("[Tlhe court finds that the plaintiff's pending execution under Ten-
nessee's new lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment .... The new
protocol presents a substantial risk of unnecessary pain ....").
39. Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation of the
Death Penalty, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763 (2008).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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had been using to evaluate lethal injection challenges, ranging from
an "'unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering'"
(Morales), to an "'unacceptable risk of suffering unconstitutional
pain and suffering"' (Taylor), to an "'unnecessary and wanton in-
fliction of pain"' (Harbison).42 These components make clear that
the lower courts have disagreed about what test established a con-
stitutional violation. In addition, inmates have challenged the
three-drug protocol on a number of issues: the types and dosages
of drugs; how the drugs are prepared; the site of veins used for
access; the training and qualifications of execution personnel; the
location and quality of execution facilities; the ability to ensure the
inmate's unconsciousness, as well as technical matters bearing on
all these factors, such as the length of the injection procedure's tub-
ing and the extent to which the inmate can be viewed while being
executed.
Following a detailed examination of the most recent lethal injec-
tion challenges, Gaitan concludes by investigating ways the three-
drug protocol can be used so that it does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Gaitan's suggestions include the involvement of
medical professionals to oversee such critical aspects of the proce-
dure as monitoring the depth of anesthesia, the mixing of drugs,
and the flushing of intravenous lines-irrespective of the ethics
concerns cited by several medical societies. "Without physician in-
volvement," Gaitan writes, "it may be impossible to ensure a lethal
injection execution that is not cruel and unusual punishment."43
Therefore, the American Medical Association's ethical prohibition
against medical participation in executions "is inconsistent with a
desire for a humane lethal injection death under constitutional
precepts."'44 Gaitan makes clear his stance; state agencies should
not punish physicians for participating in executions as long as cap-
ital punishment is state-sanctioned, lest animal euthanasia contin-
ues to be more humane than the execution of humans.
Gaitan also strikes a bold step forward by listing alternative pro-
tocol options. Such potential choices include an overdose of a sin-
gle barbiturate, much like what Fogel suggested, or carbon
42. Id. at 772-73 (quoting Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039 (N.D.
Cal. 2006), aff'd, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1163 (2006); Tay-
lor v. Crawford, No. 08-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26,
2006), rev'd 487 F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3568 (Apr.
21, 2008); Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (quoting
Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986))).
43. Id. at 782.
44. Id.
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monoxide poisoning, along the lines of that employed by Dr. Jack
Kevorkian. There are also non-injection execution methods, such
as the quick death the Chinese government ensured using a single
gun shot to the back of an inmate's head. Gaitan also stresses the
need for transparency and oversight in whatever protocol is se-
lected, noting for example that protocols should be in writing and,
under the best of circumstances, available to the public. As Gaitan
explains, he directed the state of Missouri to produce a written pro-
tocol. This action, if followed by all death penalty states, would
substantially reduce the burden on both courts and litigants in fu-
ture lethal injection challenges. Much of lethal injection litigation
simply concerns attorneys' attempts to get the information they
need to prepare a proper challenge.
Gaitan concludes with a statement about the need for hierarchi-
cal decision making when it comes to the lethal injection process.
In his view, state legislatures are the better branch to examine the
current three-drug protocol so that they can provide guidance to
the courts; otherwise, judges are inclined to process challenges on a
case-by-case basis. The dire consequences of such an unstructured
system are evident in the perpetuation of the status quo and the
current lethal injection procedure. As Gaitain warns, "[t]hose who
want death with a certain degree of torture may have found a safe
haven in the three-drug protocol. 4 5
In Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death
Penalty in the United States, Richard C. Dieter takes a somewhat
wider perspective on where lethal injection challenges stand rela-
tive to other types of anti-death penalty litigation over the decades.
According to Dieter, the latest lethal injection challenges "have al-
ready held up more executions, and for a longer time than appeals
involving such broad issues as race, innocence, and mental compe-
tency."'46 Dieter investigates the process behind this hold-up by fo-
cusing in particular on the public's perception of capital
punishment.
Dieter begins with an analysis of this country's earlier execution
methods and how each method corresponded with the country's
perception of the death penalty generally. With each change in ex-
ecution technique came an accompanying alteration in how citizens
viewed the state in its capacity as an executioner. For example,
when New York state replaced hanging with electrocution in 1890,
45. Id. at 787.
46. Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the
Death Penalty in the United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 789 (2008).
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the death penalty's purpose also changed, "from one where the
state was sending a warning to the community to one where the
state enacted retribution on the offender" using the latest scientific
advancements.47
Dieter then focuses on why the current lethal injection debates
differ from those of other execution methods in prior decades and
how that evolution has altered the way execution methods are car-
ried out. One key reason is that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause was not even applicable to the
states until 1962;48 in turn, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1966 ("AEDPA") put constraints on the filing of
habeas petitions as well as confined the issues that could be
raised.49 While lethal injection challenges were relatively ineffec-
tual in this restricted context, that circumstance began to change
with the introduction of DNA testing. A seeming explosion of ex-
onerations of innocent death row inmates prompted the perception
that the states were making serious errors in the carrying out of the
death penalty. As a result there were declines in death sentences,
executions, and public support of the death penalty while the level
of scrutiny of cases increased. This focus had ripple effects. Within
due time, a number of highly publicized electrocution and lethal
gas botches prompted states to turn even more to lethal injection,
hiding behind the method's medical veneer of humaneness and
peace.
In substantial detail, Dieter also traces the process by which at-
torneys used civil rights actions under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act5" to avoid AEDPA's restrictions. Recognizing that in-
mates were challenging lethal injection and not the death penalty
itself, in 2004, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a section
1983 lethal injection claim,51 a decision the Court validated further
two years later in another context.52 The accompanying increase in
section 1983 challenges resulted in vastly different state-wide reac-
tions, with some states recognizing the challenges as legitimate civil
rights suits while other states allowed suits to be filed, but granted
no stays or hearings.
47. Id. at 791.
48. Id. at 793 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962)).
49. Id. at 795 (citing The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214).
50. Id. at 800 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
51. Id. at 801 (citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 645 (2003)).
52. Id. at 801-02 (citing Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006)).
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The split among circuits prompted the Court to choose Baze, a
Kentucky case, for deciding the direction of lethal injection chal-
lenges.53 As Dieter notes, "Kentucky seemed an unlikely state to
select for such a review"; 54 the state had conducted only one lethal
injection execution and the suit that petitioners brought had not
been scrutinized by the federal hearings being carried out in similar
kinds of cases. Rather, Kentucky's hearings were held only in state
court and concerned only Kentucky's procedures and short execu-
tion history. Regardless, the selection of Baze had immediate ef-
fects. Apart from a highly controversial execution carried out in
Texas on September 25, 2007, the same day the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Baze,55 there had been no executions until
May 6, 2008.56 While further executions are inevitable, Dieter em-
phasizes how narrow a case Baze is and how "[t]he Supreme
Court's decision will only partially affect this [lethal injection]
debate. 57
Likewise, Dieter highlights the range of problems and incompe-
tence revealed by cases such as Morales, Taylor, and Harbison.
With greater physician involvement in lethal injection challenges
and increased coverage of the topic in medical journals, the lethal
injection debate has come out of hiding. In addition, a number of
different news sources have reported in great detail over the last
few years the difficulties and inconsistencies with lethal injection,
including widely-publicized botches. As Dieter explains and dem-
onstrates quantitatively, this accumulating kind of evidence can
shake the public's confidence not only about the carrying out of
execution methods, but also about the death penalty itself.
In Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and
Animal Euthanasia, Ty Alper also looks at the significance of the
public's attention to the lethal injection debate.5" He emphasizes
that the attention would be stronger still if the public were more
aware of how inhumanely inmates were executed as compared to
the euthanasia of animals. More pointedly, Alper draws upon the
history of animal euthanasia and curariform drugs to argue against
the use of pancuronium bromide in the three-drug lethal injection
protocol. A facet of this history, which begins Alper's article, is
53. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 34 (2007).
54. Dieter, supra note 46, at 803.
55. Id. at 804 (discussing the execution of Michael Richard).
56. See Dewan, supra note 21, at Al.
57. Dieter, supra note 46, at 806.
58. Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal
Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817 (2008).
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evidence that the medical chair of the Texas prison system rejected
a Texas veterinarian's proposal to use as the state's method of exe-
cution the technique often applied in animal euthanasia. That
technique was an overdose of one drug, sodium pentobarbital. De-
spite the veterinarian's assurances that the single drug was "'very
safe, very effective, and very cheap"' the prison system's doctor
was concerned about the outcry that could result if the public
thought inmates were being treated the same way as animals.5 9
Seemingly for this reason only, Texas decided to adopt Oklahoma's
three-drug formula instead.
Alper notes the ironic twist since that 1980s episode in Texas.
With the help of expert veterinarians, attorneys today are question-
ing whether states will continue to hold the standard for executing
human beings below that used by veterinarians to euthanize ani-
mals. Such testimony primarily concerns the use of pancuronium
bromide for two reasons. First, the veterinary and animal welfare
communities condemn the use of neuromuscular blocking agents
such as pancuronium bromide in animal euthanasia because the
drugs are considered inhumane. And second, these communities
have adopted a safer and easier procedure (an overdose of pento-
barbital) that, for unclear reasons, states have shunned for human
executions. To put this debate in context, Alper's article provides a
thorough history and evaluation of the paralytic drugs, starting
with their tribal origins up to the use of curare in vivisection exper-
iments and through the end of nineteenth century antivivisection
laws passed in Great Britain.
In human medicine, curare emerged as a new anesthetic tool in
the 1940s, although its horrific risks were known early on. Cur-
rently, paralysis without adequate anesthesia, also known as "anes-
thesia awareness," occurs in about 20,000 to 40,000 cases each year;
in 2006, an American Society of Anesthesiologists task force put
forth an extended advisory in an effort to limit the number of
cases. Indeed, Alper notes that for modern purposes, the paralytic
is used in lethal injection executions to protect witnesses from the
inmate's contractions, twitches, and grasps that are at times facets
of even a painless death. While during the oral argument in Baze,
the state emphasized that the paralytic provided the inmate with a
more "dignified" death devoid of the involuntary twitching, Alper
brings such a stance into question by examining in detail the guide-
lines followed by the American Veterinary Medical Association
59. Id. (quoting Adam Liptak, States Hesitate to Lead Change on Executions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2008, at Al).
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("AVMA"). Those guidelines promote an overdose of pentobarbi-
tal as the "'preferred method"' for euthanizing animals.60 Not
only can the single-drug procedure be given with ease even by less
trained shelter workers, but "no AVMA-approved method of eu-
thanasia includes a paralytic. '61 Also, the Humane Society "ex-
pressly condemns the use of curariform drugs like the one used in
human lethal injections. 62
In an effort to investigate how states stand on the issue, Alper
provides a uniquely thorough examination and categorization of all
the state laws and regulations that control animal euthanasia as
well as the legislative histories that led to their enactment. Accord-
ing to Alper, the results are striking. "[V]irtually all lethal injec-
tions in this country have taken place in states that either explicitly
or implicitly ban the use of paralyzing drugs in animal euthana-
sia."' 63 Kentucky exemplifies such a state because state regulations
mandate the anesthetic-only euthanasia procedure for "certified
animal euthanasia specialists" who work in animal shelters and do
not have the expertise of veterinarians.
Alper ends his article by contrasting the differing medical and
moral approaches used for animals versus humans. While the vet-
erinary and animal welfare communities promote a procedure that
really is humane, states' uses of lethal injection maintain a method
that looks humane but carries a high risk of being anything but
that.
In Anomalies: Ritual and Language in Lethal Injection Regula-
tions,64 Leigh B. Bienen takes a more textual and symbolic focus
on lethal injection issues, including human and animal procedure
comparisons, by starting with the following premise: "[t]he state
lethal injection protocols do not regulate lethal injections, but in-
stead describe hypothetical rituals meant to reassure the reader-
whomever that might be-that a controlled and orderly process, in
accordance with the rule of law, will take place. ' 65 But, as Bienen
contends, such so-called reassurance has no validity. Rather, lethal
injection protocols and regulations are "indirect, incomplete, re-
plete with medical and scientific inaccuracies, and padded with ir-
60. Id. at 835 (quoting AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N GUIDELINES ON EUTHANA-
SIA 11 (2007), available at http://www.avma.org/issues/animal-welfare/euthanasia.pdf).
61. Id. at 838.
62. Id. at 837.
63. Id. at 821.
64. Leigh B. Bienen, Anomalies: Ritual and Language in Lethal Injection Regula-
tions, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857 (2008).
65. Id.
2008] 713
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
relevant statements and descriptions of imagined events. '6 6 They
are written not for doctors or other medically trained individuals,
but instead for the benefit of witnesses and the ill-trained individu-
als who actually carry out the executions. Also, the protocols are
frequently "pseudo-scientific" in their narrative and specific terms.
For example, some of the protocols, such as New Mexico's, are
very detailed, including such information as a "pre-execution in-
ventory and equipment check," which mandates that the execu-
tioners assess the dates by which time certain items used in the
execution will expire or no longer be sterile.67 Yet Bienen wonders
why there is any need for sterile instruments since there is no possi-
bility of post-operative infection. Even the numbering systems in
some of the protocols are illogical, as though a visually hierarchical
list will give a semblance of organization that is missing from the
protocol's contents.
The theme that executions are ritualized and take on a "con-
trolled and orderly process" is also incorporated in Bienen's com-
parisons of modern day lethal injection techniques to those
procedures carried out by Nazi doctors in Auschwitz. Wearing
white coats and handling syringes as if they were performing medi-
cal checks on a patient, Dr. Josef Mengele and other Nazi doctors
delivered phenol injections directly to the victim's heart. Individu-
als injected through a vein lingered too long, dying slowly in a set-
ting in which speed and efficiency were paramount; in contrast,
heart injections caused almost immediate death.
Other execution rituals throughout European history allowed a
degree of discretion and preparation for the condemned that was
not made available by Nazi doctors. The rituals also accentuated
the real and symbolic choices that the prisoners must make before
they die. These choices could include the selection of an execution
method, a preference for the final meal, the last words that a pris-
oner might speak, and even what ceremonial clothes to wear. In
modern day lethal injection rituals, there are also choices that,
while more medicalized, can be compared to those of long ago:
"[t]he state protocols' concern with cleanliness, unexpired drugs,
the insistence upon the color white (white sheets, white walls, and
white coats for the technicians), and requirements regarding steril-
ity are analogous to primitive rules governing purity at sites where
spirits or evil forces are to be expunged. '68 Bienen stresses, how-
66. Id. at 860.
67. Id. at 863.
68. Id. at 873.
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ever, that the modern execution process should enable distinctions
to be made between the potentially unconstitutional pain and suf-
fering an inmate may experience during the execution, and the hor-
rifying perception of such agony by witnesses. As Bienen asserts,
execution witnesses have no constitutional claim when they view a
ghastly execution and therefore suffer as a result. Yet complaints
about the tragedies of watching executions have been particularly
influential avenues for encouraging legislatures to move to another
form of execution. In an effort for states to forestall such a move,
execution protocols become "window dressing, stage directions,
the establishment of ritual, designed to create an illusion of an or-
derly, humane, dignified procedure for a controlled euthanasia."69
This refined presentation troubles Bienen, however, because it is
so far off base. After all, lethal injection is a punishment. If state
legislatures wanted it to be humane they would use a large single
dose of a fast acting barbiturate. Yet the legislatures, courts, and
prison personnel perpetuate the use of the paralytic drug that hides
the inmate's jerks and groans, thereby thwarting the validity of the
death penalty and also the rule of law. According to Bienen, if the
United States continues to cling to capital punishment, then it is
only right that its citizens concede that all of the ritualistic practices
and irrelevant details of executions, much less the white sheets and
lab coats, are simply for the peace and welfare of the observers and
prison actors. Bienen bucks such pretense. "The law owes to itself
and its practitioners that honesty, that acknowledgement.
70
Jonathan I. Groner focuses on the related theme of the medical
profession's active and long term involvement in capital punish-
ment in The Hippocratic Paradox: The Role of the Medical Profes-
sion in Capital Punishment in the United States.7 1 In a continuing
quest to make execution methods more humane, physicians con-
tributed to the creation of many agents of death-the guillotine,
the electric chair, the gas chamber, and lethal injection. But only
lethal injection was designed to actually mimic a medical practice
(the induction of general anesthesia), as well as incorporate instru-
ments and expertise typically used for healing patients. As a result,
the current dominance of lethal injection, given the rarity of other
kinds of execution methods, has forced the hand of the medical
profession to become identified with causing state-sanctioned
69. Id. at 879.
70. Id. at 880.
71. Jonathan I. Groner, The Hippocratic Paradox: The Role of the Medical Profes-
sion in Capital Punishment in the United States, 35 FOROHAM URB. L.J. 883 (2008).
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death. This chain of events has also prompted an ethical conflict,
what Groner calls the "Hippocratic paradox." The "paradox exists
because it is immoral for medical professionals to increase the risk
of another human being suffering torture by not participating, but
also immoral for medical professionals to perform executions, be-
cause such participation risks irreparable harm to the medical pro-
fession and to the community as a whole." '72
Groner's article starts with the history of physician involvement,
stating that while the precise origins of participation are not
known, during the eighteenth century, Dr. Louis Guillotin was
"[t]he first, and still the most famous, physician to be associated
with a specific killing technique."73 While the guillotine was first
made available to aristocrats and royalty only, through Guillotin's
efforts it could be used by all condemned irrespective of their so-
cial class because such beheadings were considered humane and
instantaneous. But the mark of medicine on execution techniques
did not stop with the guillotine. Groner discusses the medical
mechanics of all the earlier execution methods used in this country:
hanging, electrocution, lethal gas, and the firing squad. (Ultimately
Groner believes the firing squad can lead to a "nearly instantane-
ous and painless death.") 74
Groner then provides an overview of the development of lethal
injection and the medical specifics of how injection operates. He
notes that despite the international use of intravenous and intra-
cardiac injections in prior eras, most notably in the death camps in
Nazi Germany, lethal injection was not adopted in the United
States until 1977, and not actually used until 1982. Statewide de-
pictions of lethal injection as a way of putting prisoners to sleep
prompted the method's popularity and the subsequent increase in
executions throughout the 1990s. By the time the execution rate
peaked in 1999, the great majority of those executions had been
conducted with lethal injection. Also, many executions took place
in quick succession. Indeed, in Groner's eyes, the ability of some
U.S. prisons to kill with such efficiency prompted comparisons with
the execution agenda of the Nazi euthanasia program. But execu-
tion efficiency has its distinct limits, moral ones for sure, but also
technological ones that result in botched executions.
Groner next offers a thorough analysis of the medical problems
and deficiencies in a range of botched lethal injection executions
72. Id. at 884.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 887.
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across different states and decades, as well as an examination of
recent studies of lethal injection drugs, including the Lancet study75
that Fogel also mentioned.76 In Groner's eyes, it is the combined
effect of all this information that fueled the recent lethal injection
challenges. Yet, in addition, the legal, administrative, and legisla-
tive inadequacies of the lethal injection process have pushed physi-
cians into the realm of the execution world because medical
expertise is so sorely needed. For example, cases in Georgia, Mis-
souri, North Carolina, and California have all involved in one way
or another the controversial participation of physicians-a situa-
tion that jars medical associations. The reasons are straightfor-
ward. The Hippocratic Oath, the ethical principle established for
the medical profession since antiquity, sets forth a firm standard,
stated most succinctly as follows: "'[F]irst, do no harm."'7 7 This
view is shared, nationally and internationally, across a wide span of
different medical professions. The World Medical Organization,
World Psychiatric Association, International Council of Nurses,
American College of Physicians, American Medical Association,
and American Society of Anesthesiologists, for example, have all
voiced their public concern and opposition regarding the medical
profession's participation in executions. Yet the state medical
boards hold the true power to discipline physicians for their in-
volvement in executions-a level of authority that can vary de-
pending on the particular state and circumstance.
Groner contends that a medical professional "harms his or her
relationships with other patients by participating in an execution
78
for a range of reasons. In particular, patients lack trust in a physi-
cian who can kill another human being. This fear is accentuated by
the anonymity of those involved in executions so that patients may
never know that their physician participates in lethal injections. In-
deed, "the medical nature of the execution process leads to an in-
version of values, where killing is seen as therapeutic" and the
catharsis of executing a prisoner is at times described as a "'heal-
ing' effect" for the victim's family or even the entire community.79
Groner notes that "[a] similar perversion of values-the medical-
75. Id. at 899 (citing Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anesthesia in Lethal
Injection for Execution, 365 LANCET 1412 (2005)).
76. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. Groner, supra note 71, at 902.
78. Id. at 905.
79. Id. at 907.
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ization of killing-was also at the heart of the Nazi T-4 'euthanasia'
program." 80
Court rulings in California, Missouri, and North Carolina, as well
as other states, have conflicted with national and international
standards of medical ethics because they have either mandated or
provided the opportunity to incorporate physicians into the lethal
injection process. The result is the "'Hippocratic paradox' where it
is unethical for physicians not to participate in lethal injection, but
also unethical for physicians to participate. ' 81 In an effort to quell
the dilemma, state lawyers have proposed four primary approaches
to lethal injection executions: (1) "medical coercion" (for example,
providing physicians who participate in executions payments in
cash as well as assurances of anonymity); (2) "technology substitu-
tion" (for instance, suggesting a way of substituting a prior faulty
procedure with a presumably improved alternative, such as an an-
esthetic-only injection protocol which nonmedical professionals
can more easily use); (3) "medical professional ambiguity" (placing
the physician in an intentionally "ambiguous role" in the execu-
tion context so that the precise extent of the physician's actual in-
volvement is not clear); and (4) "medical situational morality"
(contending that the physician's participation during an actual exe-
cution is exempt from the medical profession's ethical obligations).
Despite the extent of the debate concerning physician participa-
tion, however, Groner concludes that the dilemma posed by the
Hippocratic paradox "cannot be resolved without corrupting the
fundamental ethics of medicine. ' 82 Recognizing that after Baze,
physicians will once again become involved in executions, Groner
offers a recommendation. "[I]n order to preserve its professional
ethics, and its position as a morally protective force in society, the
medical profession must work to abolish capital punishment. '83
Teresa A. Zimmers and Leonidas G. Koniaris approach physi-
cian involvement in lethal injection from yet another perspective:
empirical research on the drugs that are used in injections. In Peer-
Reviewed Studies Identifying Problems in the Design and Imple-
mentation of Lethal Injection for Execution,' the authors empha-
size the complete lack of investigation of an execution method that
80. Id. at 908.
81. Id. at 909.
82. Id. at 916.
83. Id. at 917.
84. Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying
Problems in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injection for Execution, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919 (2008).
[Vol. XXXV
LETHAL INJECTION: LAW & SCIENCE
is now so widely implemented. "Although lethal injection gives the
appearance of a medical procedure, no research whatsoever-
clinical, veterinary, medical literature search, or other-was ever
performed" either before Oklahoma adopted lethal injection or
Texas conducted the first lethal injection execution.85 In addition,
evidence provided during lethal injection litigation, as well as eye-
witness testimony and scientific data, demonstrate a wide range of
problems in lethal injection protocols.
In an effort to further reveal the dearth of objective information
on how lethal injection drugs may cause death, the authors ex-
amine two peer-reviewed studies on lethal injection. Given the sig-
nificance of the peer-review process in enhancing the likelihood
that scientific journals publish valid and reliable articles, Zimmers
and Koniaris first describe what that process entails. In essence,
authors submit manuscripts to journals which are then rigorously
screened by other experts in the same field according to the quality
and sophistication of the research, the statistical analysis, overall
scholarship, and any other criteria the journal may have. Based
upon any criticisms and exchanges that may result from the jour-
nal's evaluation, the journal's editors and reviewers then determine
whether the manuscript's data are consistent with the authors' con-
clusions and whether other researchers may be able to replicate or
rely on the data presented.
In the medical profession, publications that are not subject to
peer-review are not taken as seriously as those that are. Zimmers
and Koniaris emphasize, however, that in lethal injection chal-
lenges, courts have relied substantially on non-peer-reviewed work.
Such work includes, for example, the testimony of experts who are
compensated for their efforts, and who also bypass the "unbiased
expert review and criticism" of the peer-review process. 86 As a re-
sult, "otherwise scientifically unsupportable conclusions can be
used as a basis for judicial opinions."87 In an attempt to rectify this
situation and provide peer-reviewed work that could also be used
in court, Zimmers and Koniaris investigated "all available data per-
taining to lethal injection drug delivery and outcomes" and pub-
lished their results with co-authors in "two of the world's leading
85. Id. at 921.
86. Id. at 922.
87. Id.
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[peer-reviewed] journals in general medicine":"8 the Lancet in
200589 and the Public Library of Science (PloS) Medicine in 2007. 90
The Lancet article received extensive attention both by the judi-
ciary and the medical profession.91 Based on a review of post-
mortem serum thiopental levels derived from the autopsies of exe-
cuted inmates in several states, the authors drew striking conclu-
sions. "[I]n many instances," the serum thiopental levels "were
much lower than that which would be required for general anesthe-
sia." 92 In addition, not only did the execution personnel "in many
jurisdictions" have "no anesthesia or medical training," but there
was no direct administration of the drugs to the inmate, no moni-
toring of the inmate's level of consciousness, no supervision of the
procedure's end result, nor any consistency with standard veteri-
nary practices in the administration of animal euthanasia. The re-
sults of the Lancet article were not without criticism or
controversy, however, and a number of researchers wrote the Lan-
cet's editor with their objections. The article's authors answered
each of these researchers' objections point-by-point, and their con-
clusions about their lethal injection study remain resolute. As
Zimmers and Koniaris explain, "[t]o date, the Lancet paper has
withstood three years of scrutiny in the scientific literature without
having a single claim disproved or even substantively
challenged. ,93
As a follow-up to the Lancet study, Zimmers, Koniaris, and their
co-authors published another article in PloS Medicine. This second
article examined the accuracy of explanations of the pathophysi-
ology of lethal injection, specifically, whether the current lethal in-
jection protocol actually leads to a quick and minimally painful
death. The authors relied on the lethal injection practices in North
Carolina and California because those states had the most data.
By calculating the actual thiopental doses given to North Carolina
inmates based upon the body weights recorded on autopsy reports,
the authors reached the following conclusion. "[T[he dose of thio-
pental used in lethal injections overlaps the clinical range-clearly
88. Id. at 923.
89. See Koniaris et al., supra note 25, at 1412-14.
90. Teresa A. Zimmers et al., Lethal Injection for Execution: Chemical Asphyxia-
tion?, 4 PLoS MED. 0646-53 (2007).
91. Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 17, at 104-06 (discussing cases
and medical journals in which the Lancet article has been cited).
92. Zimmers & Koniaris, supra note 84, at 924.
93. Id. at 925.
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a dose not designed to be fatal."94 Yet the execution logs in Cali-
fornia were even more informative. Evidence demonstrated "that
inmates continued to breathe for 1 to 9 minutes after 5 grams of
thiopental, indicating that thiopental does not reliably induce re-
spiratory arrest. 95
In a further effort to clarify the means by which lethal injection
works, the authors noted the general consensus: "[T]he mechanism
of death is or involves cardiac arrest from potassium chloride. '96
Yet data from lethal injections conducted in both California and
North Carolina suggest otherwise. In California, some inmates re-
quired up to eight minutes to undergo cardiac arrest while in North
Carolina, "times to death were not statistically different in execu-
tions using potassium chloride versus those that did not." 97 Thus,
the authors could not reliably demonstrate that potassium chloride
is sufficient to induce death in lethal injection executions. Indeed,
in those circumstances where neither sodium thiopental nor potas-
sium chloride is at a sufficient level to induce death, "death is likely
effected by paralysis and asphyxiation."9 "
Altogether, these findings lead to a stunning conclusion put forth
by the authors. There is "strong evidence that the lethal injection
protocol provides a substantial risk of inadequate anesthesia both
due to failures of process, as well as problems in the protocol de-
sign itself."99 Therefore, the procedure does not appear to operate
in the way that is intended. Likewise, all parties in lethal injection
should be aware of the acute lack of information available to con-
duct the kind of research necessary to assess what constitutes a
substantial risk.
Mark Dershwitz and Thomas K. Henthorn provide additional
empirical approaches for examining the effects of lethal injection
drugs, particularly sodium thiopental in The Pharmacokinetics and
Pharmacodynamics of Thiopental As Used in Lethal Injection.100
As the authors explain, from about the mid-1940s to the mid-1990s,
thiopental "was the most commonly used intravenous anesthetic
94. Id. at 927.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 928.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 929.
100. Mark Dershwitz & Thomas K. Henthorn, The Pharmacokinetics and Pharma-
codynamics of Thiopental As Used in Lethal Injection, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 931
(2008).
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agent."' 1° Therefore, in the 1970s, it was reasonable for the cre-
ators of the original lethal injection protocol to select thiopental as
the drug needed to render an inmate unconscious before injecting
pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. In order to ex-
amine more specifically how thiopental functions when used in an
execution, the authors apply two types of strategies,
pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics. As used in the article,
pharmacokinetics "is the study of the concentration of thiopental
as a function of time in tissues (particularly brain)"; in turn, phar-
macodynamics "is the study of the effects of thiopental (particu-
larly the production of unconsciousness and impairment of the
heart's ability to circulate blood). ' 10 2 By relying on "generally ac-
cepted" mathematical modeling strategies and a substantial body
of research on the pharmacology of thiopental, the authors set
forth their goals in predicting such important information as the
onset and duration of thiopental's effects in the execution context.
Determining when an inmate is expected to become unconscious
("onset") and how long the inmate is expected to stay unconscious
("duration") are key considerations in assessing the constitutional-
ity of any lethal injection protocol.
Dershwitz and Henthorn's study of thiopental demonstrates the
extent to which the drug's effects are dependent on the circum-
stances under which it is being used and the makeup of the person
being injected. While pharmacology and anesthesiology texts typi-
cally depict thiopental as an "'ultra-short acting' sedative/hypnotic
agent," the authors claim that this characterization "is semantically
correct, but only when thiopental is compared to other barbitu-
rates."'0 3 During surgery, when thiopental was used to induce a
general anesthetic in a typical adult patient, for example, the stan-
dard dose was approximately 300 mg, the amount needed to keep
the patient unconscious for 5 to 10 minutes. Yet after that thiopen-
tal injection, a physician would usually administer anesthetic gases
to maintain a patient's unconscious state until surgery was over. In
essence, then, thiopental is a drug that typically initiates a patient's
unconscious state at the start of surgery while other agents keep
the patient unconscious throughout surgery.
Lethal injection protocols generally list doses of thiopental rang-
ing from 2000 to 5000 mg, amounts that are about seven-to-sixteen
times greater than the doses administered in a typical anesthetic.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 932.
103. Id.
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Yet "the relationship between the dose of thiopental and its dura-
tion of action is not linear."104 Thus, a sevenfold increase in a dose
of thiopental that peaks at 2000 mg will not result in a sevenfold
increase in the duration of an individual's state of unconsciousness.
The increase in duration will actually be "much more."'1 5
The interrelationship between an individual's level of conscious-
ness and potential for perceiving pain is complex but also critical in
assessing lethal injection's acceptability. As the authors note, a
person made unconscious by way of thiopental will not have a con-
scious perception of pain. At the same time, that unconscious per-
son's body may demonstrate reflex reactions to pain in a number of
ways-by showing movement, a fast heart rate, sweating, or tear-
ing. In addition, those unconscious reactions to pain may revert
that individual back to a state of consciousness, "making it difficult
to distinguish between [unconscious] reflex responses to pain and
conscious response." 1 6 Recognizing the potential problems posed
by such confusion, some commentators have recommended that
"deep unconsciousness, as defined by burst suppression on the
electroencephalogram ("EEG"), be the level of unconsciousness
produced in lethal injection.' 10 7
After this overview, the authors introduce their calculations of
the onset times for thiopental administered at various injection
rates. Relying on principles of anesthesiology and pharmacology,
in addition to published data, the authors present a series of mod-
els simulating the onset of thiopental's effects "from any given
dose or injection speed."'1 8 The analysis specifically examines
levels of unconsciousness and burst suppression for three different
doses of thiopental: 2000 mg, 3000 mg, and 5000 mg.' 0 9 Of course,
onset can also be influenced by a number of factors, ranging from
an individual's levels of blood circulation and diffusion to the
mechanics of the lethal injection procedure itself; particular exam-
ples include the length of the intravenous tubing that commonly
extends from the injection room to the death chamber before
reaching the condemned's veins, as well as the location where the
catheter is inserted.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 933.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 945.
109. Id.
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The authors also examine the duration of the thiopental effect,
considering a range of extenuating requirements, for example, that
duration should exceed the amount of time needed to administer
the remaining two drugs (including the physical acts of changing
and applying different syringes). Because the potassium chloride
should take two minutes or less to cease cardiac electrical activity,
the authors calculate that fifteen minutes should be sufficient to
complete a standard lethal injection execution from the time thio-
pental is administered until electrical activity ceases. Following the
administration of a 5000 mg dose of thiopental, for instance, these
fifteen minutes would allow the average person to have a 100%
probability of becoming unconscious and achieving burst suppres-
sion on the EEG. Following a 3000 mg dose, the same person will
have a 100% probability of becoming unconscious and a 95%
probability of having burst suppression on the EEG. While a 2000
mg dose of thiopental requires less time to inject than a 5000 mg
dose, it will also have a lesser effect in decreasing cardiac output.
The authors conclude that for most people, doses of 2000 mg or
more of thiopental will be lethal.
Applying these concepts and calculations to determine the ac-
ceptability of lethal injection execution procedures, the authors
support what has become the following consensus of opinion: "The
greatest risk to the inmate, in terms of the humaneness of an exe-
cution, is the administration of pancuronium and/or potassium
chloride to an inmate who is conscious."'110 The authors note, of
course, that this risk could be substantially diminished if execution-
ers could demonstrate that the inmate is unconscious before the
other drugs are administered. On the other hand, determining the
depth of an inmate's level of conscious awareness is far more com-
plex; that responsibility would mandate the contributions of more
trained and qualified personnel.
The authors also emphasize that although some states regularly
perform autopsies on executed inmates (a policy that can provide
blood for determining the concentration of thiopental), the proce-
dures are often improperly conducted and the blood samples
wrongly interpreted. For example, thiopental demonstrates post-
mortem redistribution (meaning that, even after an inmate's death
and loss of circulation, the inmate's blood concentration continues
to decline); yet "very little information on the postmortem kinetics
110. Id. at 949.
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of thiopental [exists] because historically thiopental has been of lit-
tle importance to forensic toxicologists.""'
In an effort to provide some insight on this information gap, the
authors analyze data gathered by medical examiners in three juris-
dictions in which paired blood samples were collected following ex-
ecutions. The first blood sample was obtained "soon" (within an
hour) after the execution and the second blood sample was ac-
quired 7-to-18 hours later, at the time of the autopsy. The data
table the authors present constitutes "the only example of paired
data in which blood samples were drawn from the same inmate at
different times following death. 11 2 Statistically, the authors inter-
pret the data to conclude "that there is a 99.9987% probability of a
significant decrease in the blood thiopental concentration as a func-
tion of time following death by lethal injection where death closely
follows a single rapid infusion of the drug.11 3 According to the
authors, the data suggest that postmortem redistribution of thio-
pental does indeed take place. In addition, their analyses indicate
"that a rise in blood thiopental concentrations would be seen if
similar paired postmortem samples were obtained when death oc-
curred much longer after a dose of thiopental. '' n 4 The authors also
emphasize a critical finding-"that there may be substantial and
clinically meaningful differences" in thiopental concentration in ar-
teries as opposed to veins, a variance that must be considered when
examining postmortem redistribution data." 5
Such results invite recommendations and conclusions and the au-
thors rise to the challenge. Their first point is unsurprising. If ex-
ecutioners make no egregious mistakes and follow to the word the
three-drug lethal injection protocols that the authors examined, in-
mates will die rapidly and "without undue pain or suffering. 1116
Likewise, Dershwitz and Henthorn believe the foremost advantage
of the three-drug protocol is that it has a "definite and rapid end-
point," specifically, "the onset of a flat-line [electrocardiogram]
that can be assessed remotely by viewing an [electrocardiogram]
monitor.""' 7 The primary disadvantage of the three-drug protocol
is predictable. There is a risk that a conscious inmate would expe-
rience pain and suffering if given insufficient levels of thiopental
111. Id. at 951.
112. Id. at 952.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 953.
117. Id. at 955.
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and then injected with the pancuronium bromide and potassium
chloride. Another downside is that because the potassium chloride
"causes widespread stimulation of nerve and muscle tissue
throughout the body," its effects often induce involuntary muscle
contractions that lay witnesses in prior executions may have
thought were signs that the inmate was suffering from pain or a
seizure.' 18 Given that a large dose of thiopental is an "excellent
anticonvulsant medication," however, the authors find it "most un-
likely" that an inmate who had been sufficiently anesthetized
would have experienced a seizure. The pancuronium bromide, of
course, can eliminate these involuntary contractions.' 19
The key advantage of a protocol with a single large dose of thio-
pental "is that there is no risk whatsoever of the inmate experienc-
ing pain or suffering due to the effects of pancuronium or
potassium chloride.' 20 This conclusion bears emphasis in light of a
Netherlands study (which the authors partly question) suggesting
that a single administration of thiopental cannot guarantee death;
that same study also revealed that the largest dose of thiopental
ever used in the Netherlands for euthanasia purposes was only
2000 mg.121 "[I]t is therefore not surprising that such a dose was
found to be less than 100% lethal. ' 122 On the other hand, the main
disadvantage of the single drug protocol is that an inmate's death
will not immediately be reflected on the electrocardiogram moni-
tor; even though the inmate will probably die within a few minutes,
the physiological signposts for death may not show for another half
hour. This circumstance may mandate the need for a physical
exam revealing the absence of a heartbeat or another indicator of
death.
The authors do not say which of the two protocol options they
prefer (the standard three-drug protocol or the single large-dose
administration of thiopental). They do stress, however, the need
for greater transparency and data availability. "[W]e believe that
those policy makers responsible for making such decisions [about
protocol options] are entitled to accurate scientific information in
order to make an informed policy decision. "123
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 956.
121. Id. at 955 (citing Administration and Compounding of Euthanasic Agents, The
Hague (Royal Dutch Society for the Advancement of Pharmacy 1994), available at
http://wweek.com/html/euthanasics.htmi).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 956.
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In a twist in direction from Dershwitz and Henthorn, Susi Vas-
sallo focuses primarily, and far more critically, on the recommen-
dation of a single large-dose administration of thiopental. In
Thiopental in Lethal Injection, Vassallo examines existing studies
measuring thiopental and awareness and suggests that a thiopental-
only single-drug lethal injection protocol ought to be approached
with great caution. 124 She bolsters her argument in a range of ways
that reflect the differences between how thiopental is used in a
clinical medical setting as opposed to an execution.
One of Vassallo's main arguments is that irrespective of all the
research on thiopental, it "is unstudied as a single killing agent for
humans."' 5 Thiopental was not necessarily intended to be the
drug that causes death in a lethal injection procedure. Nor is thio-
pental the dominant drug for animal euthanasia; rather sodium
pentobarbital is the most frequently selected agent. According to
the American Society of Anesthesiologists' amicus brief in Baze,
"'there is no dispute that a massive or supraclinical dose of thio-
pental (as those being considered by the courts), if effectively de-
livered into the circulation, will reliably produce prolonged and
deep unconsciousness.'"126 Yet Vassallo stresses that at no point
does the brief mention thiopental's lethality.
Turning to the published scientific literature on thiopental, Vas-
sallo begins by noting that thiopental studies generally do not em-
ploy the same dose or application as lethal injection protocols;
most research uses relatively smaller amounts. Even if the
amounts of thiopental in some studies are comparable to the
amounts used in lethal injection procedures, the method of admin-
istration differs and the distinction is critical. For example, the
pharmacodynamic effect of thiopental varies depending on which
of the two ways the drug is administered: (1) a single intravenous
bolus (which constitutes "a single push on the plunger of the syr-
inge" enabling the drug to be delivered in a matter of seconds) or
(2) a continuous intravenous infusion.1 27 Jay Chapman, the chief
medical examiner of Oklahoma and creator of lethal injection's
drug combination, had suggested a continuous infusion of thiopen-
tal for Oklahoma's first lethal injection execution. Yet nearly all
124. Susi Vassallo, Thiopental in Lethal Injection, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 957
(2008).
125. Id. at 958.
126. Id. at 959 (quoting Brief for American Society of Anesthesiologists as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 63222 (U.S.
argued Jan. 7, 2008)).
127. Id. at 960 n.15.
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death penalty states today use the single intravenous bolus for con-
ducting lethal injections. According to Vassallo, "[i]f the published
studies on thiopental rely on a different means of administration
than lethal injection protocols, then it is difficult and/or inappropri-
ate to draw predictions from these studies to the lethal injection
context. "128
Another matter distinguishing thiopental studies from lethal in-
jection protocols is the source of tissue used to derive samples of
thiopental concentrations. Thiopental concentrations for purposes
of research are typically measured not in the brain but rather in
"easily obtainable" tissue sources such as blood, plasma, or fat. In
contrast, mathematical models of thiopental's effects are used to
estimate brain thiopental concentration. The drawback, then, of
using studies as a comparative standard "is that the concentration
of thiopental in one tissue source does not necessarily reflect the
other, and may not reflect the clinical condition of the
individual. 129
Lastly, some thiopental studies employ "pharmacokinetic-phar-
macodynamic parameters and combine infusion quantal dose-re-
sponse data.' 130 Yet "[t]he ability to accurately predict thiopental
dose-response relationships (the loss of consciousness at a certain
dose of thiopental) through computer modeling demands many
values for thiopental doses derived from average populations of
young healthy men."' 13 1 These young healthy male populations,
however, would not necessarily predict accurately the physiological
make up or conditions of an individual prison inmate. Likewise,
Vassallo details a range of other complexities that hinder the ca-
pacity of modeling studies to mirror the role of thiopental in lethal
injection executions. Future modeling techniques may bring in-
sights that do not yet exist.
Vassallo also criticizes continuous infusion studies of thiopental,
noting that "[s]hort continuous infusion of thiopental results in a
model that does not mimic the single bolus injection of thiopental
in lethal injection protocols. ' 132 Nor do long infusion models do a
better job of reflecting lethal injection procedures. A single bolus
injection into an inmate during an execution cannot compare, for
128. Id. at 960.
129. Id. at 961.
130. Id. at 962. See supra text accompanying note 102 for a definition of
pharmacokinetic-pharmacodynamic.
131. Vassallo, supra note 124, at 962.
132. Id. at 963.
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example, to the long continuous infusions designed to hold a steady
state of coma for a brain injured patient for hours or days. Vassallo
comprehensively describes a range of other kinds of studies further
demonstrating the comparative limits between research and the
implementation of an actual lethal injection.
According to Vassallo, there is a key point to take home from
her analysis of thiopental studies. "A future 'improved' method of
lethal injection-using thiopental alone, no longer requiring the
participation of medically trained professionals, and monitoring
the depth of anesthesia using [computerized methods]-is an illu-
sion." '133 In Vassallo's view, it was this country's rush to adopt unt-
ested execution method strategies that propelled the current
problems that lethal injection litigation is now revealing. This dis-
turbing history "should serve to caution against the acceptance of a
new lethal injection protocol relying on thiopental alone. ' 134
Robert Blecker's article closes the symposium issue and puts
both legal and medical arguments in context with pointed philo-
sophical reflections about the punitive purpose of lethal injection.
In Killing Them Softly: Meditations on a Painful Punishment of
Death, Blecker, a self-identified retributivist, argues that while the
Constitution rightly prohibits punishment by torture, social and le-
gal efforts to abolish all pain in punishment will simply result in the
abandonment of punishment itself.135 As Blecker explains, "[w]e
must no longer haphazardly employ execution methods that seem
indifferent to the experience of dying, attempting to obliterate
from memory the agonizing death of the victim which gives us the
right, if not the obligation, to execute the aggravated murderer.' '1 36
He urges the infusion of capital punishment "with concern and
emotional denunciation," for punishment "must and should be
painful."' 37
Blecker distinguishes between the utilitarians (who believe "pain
is evil" and inflict pain only "to prevent greater pain, by deterring
others, incapacitating or reforming the dangerous offender") and
retributivists (who believe in inflicting pain and suffering on
criminals "because they deserve it, but only to the extent they de-
serve it").'3 8 He frequently cites Cesare Beccaria's abolitionist
133. Id. at 967 (footnotes omitted).
134. Id. at 968.
135. Robert Blecker, Killing Them Softly: Meditations on a Painfid Punishment of
Death, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969 (2008).
136. Id. at 971.
137. Id. at 971-72.
138. Id. at 972-73.
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text, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments,139 which endorsed
"physically painful punishment calibrated to produce the best ef-
fects." 140 Retribution, however, is not the same as revenge; rather
retribution "must be limited and in its more mature measurement
proportional-no more (or less) than deserved.""'1  As Blecker ex-
plains, "[t]he Biblical 'eye for an eye,' originally understood as nc
more than an eye for an eye, exemplifies retribution as a restrictior
on pain as much as justification of punishment. 142
For purposes of clarification, Blecker refers to the amicus briel
submitted to the Supreme Court in Baze by the American Associa-
tion of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists. 143 According to the brief, the
Talmud urges "'the quickest, least painful, and least disfiguring
methods of execution that the technology of the day would allo"A
within the framework of Biblical texts.' ",144 Blecker refutes this ar-
gument, stating that while "the Talmud limits bodily pain, it hardl3
eliminates all technologically avoidable physical pain anc
suffering.' 145
Indeed, it was only during recent centuries that punishmeni
transformed "into something which denies its own nature" by fo-
cusing more on depriving personal liberty than inflicting pain.14
Following the Enlightenment and the founding of the early Ameri.
can republic, "[s]cientific determinism challenged free will along
with the retributive basis for punishment" and "[t]reatment re-
placed punishment as the enlightened response to crime. 1 47 The
introduction of anesthesia in the nineteenth century advertised thai
pain could be controlled, thereby casting notions of pain and pun-
ishment itself to mere abstractions. Likewise, upon observing the
growing elimination of public executions, Michel Foucault con-
cluded that punishment "'become[s] the most hidden part of the
penal process.' ",148
139. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Adolph Cas(
ed. Int'l Pocket Lib., 2d ed. 1992) (1775).
140. Blecker, supra note 135, at 973.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 974.
144. Id. (quoting Brief for the American Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurist!
("AAJLJ") as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 83(
(2008) (No. 07-5439)).
145. Id. at 975.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 976.
148. Id. at 977 (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 11, 9 (Alar
Sheridan trans., 1979)).
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These themes are, of course, transferable to modern day pro-
nouncements on pain and punishment. During the oral argument
in Baze, 14 9 for example, Blecker contends that "everybody as-
sumed without discussion that less painful punishment becomes...
more humane" and that "no state would intentionally inflict a pain-
ful death." 150 In Blecker's eyes, during the Baze oral argument and
again in the Baze plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts viewed
"'painless'" as equivalent to "'humane.' '151 Chief Justice Roberts
was countered only by Justice Scalia, who prompted the following
question: "'Where does this come from, that in the.., execution of
a person who has been convicted of killing people we must choose
the least painful method possible?'"1 52 Yet Blecker believes Jus-
tice Scalia's query missed a key point. Blecker would have asked
the question as follows: "[W]here does it come from that in the
execution of a person who has been convicted of killing people
painfully, we must choose the least painful method possible? 153
As Blecker explains, "[a]dding 'painfully' would have forced the
retributive question by implication";154 by contrast, "Scalia's ques-
tion obscures the deepest retributive issue, instead making it ap-
pear solely as a question of a state's right to reject untried or
inefficient-although-less-painful options.'
55
In Baze, Blecker notes that, like the oral argument, "the Justices
never seemed to contemplate, much less discuss, whether justice
itself might sometimes actually require imposing a painful
death.'1 56 Indeed, Justice Stevens, who chose Baze to set forth his
abolitionist views, contended "that too little pain might undermine
capital punishment's retributive function, thus eliminating its pri-
mary rationale and only possible constitutional justification. "157
Only Justice Thomas "acknowledged ... the possibility that a state
might intentionally inflict a painful death"; yet he did not consider
whether the intentionally inflicted painful death could ever be de-
served, quite the contrary.1 58 Justice Thomas also equated the
149. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
150. Blecker, supra note 135, at 978.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 978-79 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Baze v. Rees, No.
07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259 (Apr. 16, 2008)).
153. Id. at 979 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 981.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 982 (emphasis added).
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elimination of pain with constitutional acceptance of the
punishment.
According to Blecker, the current debate on lethal injection con-
cerns not only the condemned's experiences of pain, but also the
observer's since lethal injection's paralytic masks what could be a
horrifying execution sight.'a 9 Yet this goal is directly counter to
Blecker's philosophy. "Nothing could be more perverse and unjust
to a true utilitarian than pancuronium causing the condemned to
suffer an agonizing death, all the while appearing peaceful."'160 In-
deed, classic utilitarians would take the opposite approach. They
believe "that rationally structured punishment should most effec-
tively deter others while least injuring the criminal by appearing
much more painful than it feels" to criminals. 16 1 Beccaria, for ex-
ample, denounced the death penalty in favor of life in prison at
hard labor or slavery because the life punishments were "'more
terrible to the spectator than to the sufferer himself."1 62
Blecker contends that the state's "good motives" to avoid grue-
some appearances for the witnesses cannot justify the risk that the
condemned may feel pain. In Baze, however, Chief Justice Rob-
erts justified in part upholding Kentucky's use of pancuronium bro-
mide because the state has "'an interest in preserving the dignity of
the procedure, especially where convulsions or seizures could be
misperceived as signs of consciousness or distress.' 163 According
to Blecker, "today's utilitarians, following Beccaria and Bentham,
should relentlessly attack the current regime" due to the "appear-
ance-reality gap" between actual and perceived suffering.' 64 Such
false appearances are also totally unacceptable to retributivists. "If
a killer deserves a quick but painful death, we deserve the satisfac-
tion of knowing he experiences it.' 165 Alternatively, "[i]f most con-
demned killers deserve to die, but without pain, we commit a great
injustice by creating false appearances that obscure their wrongly
inflicted, unjustly suffered pain.' 1 66
159. Id. at 985.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 986 (quoting CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISH-
MENTS 109 (1788)).
163. Id. (quoting Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259, at *13 (U.S. Apr.
16, 2008)).
164. Id. at 987.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 987-88.
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According to Blecker, this "medical illusion" condemns lethal in-
jection "if nothing else does."' 67 But the illusion has also drawn
both the sympathy and ire of the medical profession which remains
directly affected by courts' holdings on lethal injection, most par-
ticularly, of course, the holdings of the Supreme Court. And the
medical profession's views also vary. Blecker notes, for example,
Dr. Mark Heath's opinion that lethal injection is "'both a medical
and a non-medical procedure.' "168 Inserting the IV line and inject-
ing an anesthetic have both medical and therapeutic purposes; but
the application of both pancuronium bromide and potassium chlo-
ride, for the purposes in which they are used, do not.1 69 Yet seek-
ing guidance from the medical establishment generally about
whether to implement lethal injection is not the solution. "[W]e
don't look to medical therapists to tell us whom to execute,"
Blecker asserts. "[M]edicine should no more tell us how.'
1 70
In essence, "[p]unishment and medicine should never resemble
each other.'' In terms of rationale, pancuronium serves as the
"perfect metaphor"; it is a medical agent that "paralyzes all, sever-
ing emotions, severing the crime, disconnecting us from what we
do, and why."'1 72 Blecker states that he and other retributivists op-
pose lethal injection "not because it possibly causes pain, but be-
cause it certainly causes confusion, arbitrarily merging punishment
and treatment, arbitrarily severing crime from punishment, pain
from justice."' 73
This Introduction's survey of articles on lethal injection repre-
sents a range of experts who participated in the Fordham Urban
Law Journal's landmark symposium, The Lethal Injection Debate:
Law and Science. The symposium provides a comprehensive and
balanced forum on the legal, medical, and ethical issues that consti-
tute the focus of lethal injection litigation after Baze. May this fo-
rum be among the first of many on this critical topic.
167. Id. at 988.
168. Id. at 990 (quoting Mark Heath, Revisiting Physician Involvement in Capital
Punishment: Medical and Nonmedical Aspects of Lethal Injection, 83 MAYO CLINIC
PROC. 115, 115 (2008)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 992.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 998.
173. Id.
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